Introduction

Not without reason, Samuel P. Huntington referred to Turkey as a *Torn Country*.¹ It is a state that geographically and historically is situated on two continents: Europe and Asia. This ‘duality’ is a feature that best portrays Turkey’s political system, which is influenced by two competing ideologies that have been in constant conflict since the establishment of the Republic in 1923: Islam and Kemalism. In theory, Turkey became a multiparty democracy after the Second World War, however the Turkish experiment with democracy was deficient from the very beginning. The shortcomings of Turkish democracy, which for example hinder Turkey’s accession process to the European Union, are a result of a longer historical process. Some scholars, such as Şerif Mardin, claim that the nature of the problem lies in the Ottoman Past, and more specifically in the social structure of the Ottoman Empire.² Others, like Rustow, see the reason for the political crisis in the republican era and the fact that the first democratic regime was, “a free gift from the hands

---

² Ş. Mardin, *Center–Periphery Relations: a Key to Turkish Politics?*, Daedalous, vol. 102, no. 1, p.169–187.
of a dictator.”3 The scope of investigation in this essay will be narrowed to the relationship between the state and Islam with particular emphasis on the way in which secular and religious laws functioned first in the Ottoman Empire, and later in Turkey.

Regarding the structure of this essay, it is firstly important to determine to what extent the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic Country. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, having taken power and introduced his secular program, stated that breaking with the Islamic Ottoman past was a prerequisite for modernization. However, after a more thorough study of the subject, it is evident that the Ottoman Empire was Islamic only on the outside, and in fact it had a secular administration. The first part of this paper will thus be devoted to the sole aim of presenting how the two domains, Islamic and Secular, coexisted and interacted with each other in one state.

In the second part of this article the nature of the political reform of Ottoman political structures that were introduced by the Sultans as a result European influence and capitalist incorporation, also known as the Tanzimat, will be analyzed. This process of westernization, which comprised also the acknowledgment of western economic, technological and military superiority, had a major impact on both the Islamic and secular structures of the Empire. Additionally, the rise of national identities within the domain of the Empire brought forth the necessity of creating a new ideology that would unite the peoples of the multi-ethnic and multicultural state. The most important problem that will be addressed in the second part of this essay will thus focus on the ways in which westernization influenced the relationship between Islam and the secular administration. It will be proven that the implementation of secular reforms was in reality a simultaneous process to the elimination of Islam from political life.

The third part of this article will throw light on how the use of political Islam by elites changed in the nineteenth and twentieth century. For the better explanation, Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of praetorian societies will be applied, which will explain the ways Sultan Abdülhamid and later the Young Turks used Islam as a mobilizing factor in achieving their political goals. It is worth mentioning that the political elites of the late Ottoman Empire simultaneously significantly enhanced the pace of secularization.

Finally, in the fourth part of this essay the outcomes of the Kemalist revolution will be analyzed. This part of the essay will focus on the attempt undertaken by the elites of subjecting the population to a completely new ideology, Kemalism, which aimed at eliminating Islam from both public and political life.

The main thesis of this paper is that both the Ottoman heritage and the Kemalist revolution have contributed significantly to the crisis in recent Turkey in two ways. Firstly, the secular reforms initiated by the Sultans led to the establishment of two ‘distinct’ groups, namely the center represented by the ruling elites, and the periphery, which consisted of different religious and ethnic groups. Secondly, the Kemalist revolution, which in fact was a continuation of over a century of secularization in its attempt to imprint into the minds of the people a new secular ideology and exclude Islam from political and public life, deepened the division between the center and the periphery.

Secularism and Islam in the Ottoman Empire

According to Omer Tespinar, Islam played a central role in legitimizing and centralizing power in the Ottoman Empire for three reasons. Firstly, Islam, more than any other mystical and esoteric shamanistic cults in the region, seemed to be the most appropriate for consolidating the power of the central authority. Secondly, the devotion to gîza, which was the ideology of waging a holy war against the unfaithful, served the very practical purpose of expanding the territorial borders of the empire and maintaining control over belligerent nomadic tribes. And thirdly, the religious law of Islam, sharia, formed an effective set of rules that helped in controlling the heterogeneous Islamic communities. Dimitry R. Zhantiev came to a similar conclusion, stating that Islamic identity supported Ottoman identity by strengthening the ties between Istanbul and the Arab provinces.

---

Islam, as mentioned above, turned out to be the most important factor that held the Ottoman Empire intact for many centuries. It was of great importance to the Ottoman central administration to establish effective links with the many peoples that inhabited the multicultural and multiethnic territories that were under the rule of the Sultans. From the four Sunni schools of Islamic thought, the Hanafi school emerged as the most suitable for the needs of the multicultural empire, as on the one hand it recognized that Islamic law \textit{sharia} could not be put into practice in certain situations due to local customs and traditions, and on the other, the definition of a strong ruler as one who takes and clings to power allowed the Sultans to justify their authority in the eyes of the Muslim populace.\footnote{W. Asbeek Brusse, I.J. Schoonenboom, \textit{The European Union and Turkey}, Amsterdam 2004, p. 94–95.} In other words, the Hanafi school was attractive not only to the ruling elites, to whom it offered the opportunity for following \textit{realpolitik},\footnote{W. Asbeek Brusse, I.J. Schoonenboom, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96.} but also to the multitude of different ethnic and also religious groups that could enjoy a certain degree of freedom. The question therefore arises as to whether a patrimonial state in which the ruler is the main source of legitimacy, can be considered Islamic. Zürcher and Van der Linden give a clear answer, claiming that while officially abiding by Islamic principles, the Ottoman Empire in fact had a secular administration and that the process of secularization of state institutions did not begin with the Kemalist reforms in the twenties of the twentieth century, but much earlier under the rule of Sultans.\footnote{Ibidem, p.46.} Hakan Yavuz supports these arguments and additionally claims that apart from being ‘patrimonial,’ the Ottoman Empire also had ‘transcendental’ characteristics, which means that the state put itself above particular local interests of the population and acted in accordance to its own logic \textit{hikmet-i hükümet} (wisdom), which by European standards can be understood as nothing else as \textit{resson d'état}.\footnote{H. Yavuz, \textit{Islamic Political Identity in Turkey}, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York 2003, p.39.}

The acceptance of Islamic principles of the Hanafi school could lead to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic State in which

\footnote{Imadalin. N.N. Al-Jubouri, \textit{Islamic Thought from Mohamed to September 11, 2010}, Xlibris Corp., Kindle Edition 2263-2321.}
sharia was the most important source of law and formed the moral and legal framework for the existence of the state and society. Most scholars unanimously agree that in principle sharia remained the highest authority in the Ottoman State. While Yavuz claims that the sultanic decrees known as the kannun could be annulled if they were contrary to Islamic law, Lewis goes further, underlining that even the Sultan could be deposed in accordance to sharia. Arguments on behalf of the fact that Islamic law played a significant role are thus irrefutable. However, in reality, as most of the representatives of the religious authorities were limited by the fact that they were state employees who could be dismissed from their posts by the Sultan, the kannun, formally inferior to the sharia, turned out to be superior and formed the backbone of Ottoman secularism. In short, it was not sharia, but the Sultan and the central administration that had the last word in the decision-making process.

In order to fully understand how the relation between state and religion worked in practice, I will present some examples of how the state administration controlled religion. Firstly, even though the Ulema, the guardians of Islamic law who were responsible for teaching, interpreting and enforcing Islamic law and had the charismatic and mobilizing power over the society, were subjected to central control, it was achieved by incorporating the institution of the Seyhuislam (the sheik of Islam), which represented the top of the ulema hierarchy, into the state apparatus. The Seyhuislam therefore had the function of the head of the judiciary and the supreme religious official. However, he, like all governmental officials, could be dismissed from his position by the Sultan. Apart from the control of the ulema, the subordination of Islam to the state was achieved by wide network of centrally controlled district judges, kadis, fluent in Islamic law, whose responsibilities were numerous and ranged from maintaining order in the provinces to collecting taxes and controlling faith-based foundations. However, these representatives of local

14 H. Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim…, p. 18.
15 O. Tespinar, op. cit., p. 10.
16 Ibidem, p.11.
17 H. Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim…, p. 18.
administration, unlike the landlords in feudal Europe, who had very often a large degree of independence, were also under strict bureaucratic control.

Regarding relations between the state and society, the secular center in the Ottoman Empire established effective mechanisms of controlling the different ethnic and religious groups of the periphery by establishing the ‘millet system,’ which made local religious leaders responsible for the civil behaviors of the different communities in which, as long as the different Christian, Arab, Armenian or any other subjected groups remained apolitical and loyal to the central authorities, the central administration did not interfere with their way of life.\textsuperscript{18} In that manner, the empire became a domain of two cultures. On one hand there was the bureaucratic ruling class with the Sultan as the highest authority, and on the other there existed the heterogeneous and multicultural periphery. Therefore, one cannot treat Islam as a uniform set of principles. Without a doubt, Islam was a ‘link’ between the state and Muslim society. Still, just as in the case of Christianity, there was a multitude of sects and religious groups that were influenced by different Islamic schools of thought, which in nature greatly differed from the official Sunni Islam represented by the central bureaucracy. While some nomadic tribes were shamanistic, or focused on nature cults,\textsuperscript{19} other leaders and followers of different brotherhoods, \textit{tarikats}, were closer or more distant from the official Sunni Islam. And finally, there were the non-Sunni Alevi and Bektaşi, which also did not form a uniform group.\textsuperscript{20} Different authors give different names to this ‘phenomenon.’ Metin Heper distinguishes the Ottoman ‘Great Culture’ of the elites from the ‘Little Culture’ of the different heterogeneous Islamic groups.\textsuperscript{21} Paul Dumont uses a different terminology and differentiates ‘official’ from the ‘free-lance’ Islam, where the former is represented by the Hanafi center and the latter that corresponds to the world of sects, brotherhoods, associations and groups of all


\textsuperscript{19} S. Faroqhi, \textit{The Ottoman Empire, a Short History}, Marcus Wiener Publishers, Princeton 2009, p. 50.


\textsuperscript{21} M. Heper, \textit{The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics}, Journal of International Affairs, 2000, 54, no 1, p. 66.
kinds that were beyond the reach of the authorities. Many authors, for instance Michael E. Meeker, Suraya Faroghi and Stefan Winter, simply refer to the religion of different groups as ‘Folk Islam.’ One way or the other, the division between the ruling and the ruled existed and was inherited by the Turkish Republic. Not without reason, Şerif Mardin sees the most important source of the weakness of the empire and later in its successor, Turkey, in the fact that there existed a gap between the center and the periphery.

Reasons for political decay, the process of westernization, and reform in the Ottoman Empire

The question arises as to why the millet system, which actually allowed the Ottomans to effectively control different ethnic and religious groups and acted as a source of political strength, later in the eighteenth and nineteenth century turned out to be a biggest weakness. How did the gap between the center and the periphery appear? In order to understand this dynamic it necessary to throw light on the economic and political changes that were taking place in Europe and around the world. With the influence of the market economy, the forces of the periphery, earlier politically docile, were provided with the chance of gaining influence. This process, quaintly called by Keyder as the process of ‘peripheration,’ deprived the central administration of its prior influence by allowing the ascendance of new influential groups from the periphery. However, in the times of this ‘emancipation of the periphery’ in the Ottoman Empire, which was natural when facing the processes of urbanization, globalization and industrialization, the European states were already on another level of development, which was the creation of the nation-state. Throughout history the Ottoman Empire developed ingenious and proficient institutions that held the country intact for

---


\[23\] Ş. Mardin, *Center–Periphery Relations…*, p. 170.

centuries. This efficiency and stability eventually led to an unexpected paradox, that is, the deterioration and disintegration of the hitherto solid state administration and judicial system. This was due to the fact that Ottoman institutions, after centuries of existence, were reluctant and unable to undergo any reform. In Western Europe the interactions between central and local authorities were in constant tension, which necessitated a conciliatory attitude represented by the monarch, central authority and the forces of the periphery, assiduously leading to the integration of the latter with the center. “Each time a compromise – or even a one sided victory – was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved.” The feudal nobility, the cities, and finally the catholic and protestant churches gained political influence and could effectively put pressure on the central authority, and what was concomitant with that, obtain the competence required for future political improvements. Allotment of individual representatives from the most strident groups was beneficial not only for the elites holding important posts, but also for the previously insignificant larger bulk of the groups that they represented. Because the Ottoman Empire lacked those ‘multiple confrontations’ the intermediary actors simply did not exist and the periphery was condemned to exclusion and perpetual aggravation. As a corollary of this, the confrontation was one-dimensional, not multilateral as in Europe, always between the center and the periphery. In addition, the Ottoman Statesmen and the Sultan cautiously and effectively eliminated local authorities from power sharing, replacing them with a strongly centralized and pervasive administrative system. Any attempts of engaging in political activity by peasants or merchants was perceived as a serious infringement of the law and strictly prohibited.

Returning to the problem of the relations between state and religion, it is necessary to understand how the Sultans attempted to tackle the crisis and reform the state. It was already stated that the Ottoman Empire consisted of two cultures, while Islamic law sharia coexisted with the Sultanic law kannun. Once facing political decay, the central authorities wanted on the one hand to sustain their former power, and on the other adopt western-style reforms in order to bring an end to the political crisis. New circumstances, however, were very unfavorable for the regime.

25 Ş. Mardin, Center–Periphery…, p. 170
The Battle of Lepanto in 1571, in which the Christian armies for the first time defeated the Ottomans, and later the defeat at Vienna in 1683, started a process called by David Goffman ‘the grand reversal,’ which put the empire on the road to a long downward process of decline. These defeats had a great impact not only on the international, but also the domestic arena, and on the political use of Islam. First of all, the Ottomans for the first time had to accept that Christian culture was not inferior to their own. What is more, with the process of economic incorporation, which was a result of establishing trading links with different European states, the strengthening of different nationalities, the threat of facing a military defeat from the Russian armies, and finally the dependence on the status quo dictated by European states, the Sultans’ legitimacy started to fade. As long as the borders of the empire were expanding, the loyalty of the different local groups of the periphery was assured by a mixture of fear and admiration. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim millets preferred to remain loyal to the Ottoman center, as any opposition would mean a military confrontation, but for most Islamic groups the Sultan was still considered a religious leader, who was waging a holy war against the infidels and expanding the boarders of Islam. With the demise of the empire, both fear and admiration disappeared. Another problem was the fact that reform could be achieved only by the integration of the empire with world markets, and the acceptance of western standards, also in the cases of education and politics. This embrace of the ‘greater western culture,’ which was indispensible to modernization, had a dual impact on society. On one hand, it meant the emancipation of the forces of the periphery, and on the other, the Islamic population started to perceive the Sultan as a puppet in the hands of the western powers, which ultimately contributed to a further decrease of the center’s legitimacy.

The required reforms, if the empire was to survive, needed to fulfill three main goals: first, modernize the obsolete administration; second, devise a new ideology that would unify society; and third, establish good relations with western European states in order to secure domestic

---

changes. The Tanzimat reforms (1830–1860) were nothing less than an attempt to manage internal and external tribulations. It is noteworthy that the Tanzimat edict itself was put into action as a result of the decision of the Sultan, in accordance with the kannun. Still, as Hakan Yavuz claims, the Tanzimat did not challenge the official Hanafi-based normative system, and upheld Islam as the source of legitimacy. However, while formally not changing the status of the Islamic system, the introduction of new secular laws did have an influence on the relations between state and religion. Although from the formal point of view the Sultans did not want to make direct moves against the sharia, the further secularization of the administration and legal reform did limit Islamic influence. This is most visible in the treatment of the non-muslim subjects of the empire. As an example, on the basis of the Imperial edict of 1839 “Muslims, Christians and Jews became the subjects of one ruler and the children of one father.” This decision meant that for the first time in Ottoman history, all inhabitants of the empire became equal before the law. These reforms, perhaps not directly, did significantly undermine the status of Islam, as they were the first attempt at creating a new form of Pan-Ottoman, a secular identity that was not based in Islamic identity. There were also other Tanzimat edicts worth mentioning, for instance those that introduced changes in the functioning of the judicial system. As Hanioğlu claims, although the new penal codes of 1840, 1851 and 1858, based on the French code, “explicitly invoked the sharia and tried to reconcile it with the principles of modern European concepts of law,” the sole fact that they were introduced caused Islamic principles to be pushed into the background. It is no surprise that a huge bulk of the Muslim population and the Ulema were opposed to the new changes.

It is from the times of the Tanzimat reforms that the Turkish elites, religious and secular, started to debate the degree of westernization, the role

31 Ibidem, p.20.
34 Ibidem, p. 16.
of religion and the pervasiveness and power of the central authorities. As the main aim of the Sultan was modernizing the state, however, without granting freedom to society, the Young Ottomans, a group of young conspirators from different backgrounds who formed a secret society, became the most significant critics of the regime.\textsuperscript{35} According to one of the main ideologists of the Young Ottomans, Namik Kemal, the \textit{Tanzimat} reforms, by “opening the gates for the West and undermining the historical existence of the Muslim community,” were damaging to the foundations of the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{36} Still, Kemal did not perceive westernization as an evil. He simply believed that there should be a limit to it. For him, the Ottoman Empire should borrow from the west everything that was superior, namely the industrial, technological, economic and educational development, to which he referred as to the ‘good’ aspects of western civilization.\textsuperscript{37} In other words, the Young Ottomans wanted to fuse modernity with the cultural and historical heritage of the empire,\textsuperscript{38} and, what is worth mentioning, they did not perceive religious and cultural differences as obstacles to change.\textsuperscript{39} Probably one of the most important achievements of the Young Ottomans was that these intellectuals were the forerunners of those who hold the idea that Islamic culture is compatible with western liberal principles.\textsuperscript{40} Also, it is thanks to the Young Ottomans that the empire received its first constitution in 1876, as it was under their political pressure that the Sultan decided to make political concessions.

As to the constitution itself, it was a desperate attempt to bring together contradictory doctrines, namely Islamism, nationalism, and Western parliamentarism. Niyazi Berkes observed that this ideological ‘unbalanced tripod,’ was destined to become lost in confusion when trying to bring together those eclectic ideas together.\textsuperscript{41} Evaluating the scope


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 216.


\textsuperscript{39} N. Berkes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 221.


\textsuperscript{41} N. Berkes, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 201–202.
of the particular articles, one can find that the traditional duality of secular and religious spheres was also visible. For instance, article 11 stated that Islam remained the official religion of the state. Furthermore, article 87 confirmed the significance of religious courts. Of course, as in the case of the relations between **sharia** and **kannun**, there was also reference to secular institutions. Still, in these double standards, just as earlier, the secular laws gave the central authorities and the Sultan the greatest power. This is evident in article 7, according to which the Sultan has the authority to carry out the requirements of religious laws. Although the constitution was not truly democratic and did not bring a departure from the authoritarian past, as the sovereignty belonged to the Sultan, it was the first attempt in Ottoman history to introduce Western-style legal reforms. Articles 17 and 9, the former stating that all Ottoman subjects are equal before the law, and the latter, which upheld personal freedoms, are worth attention.

---

**Old and new perceptions of Islam and Secularism**

The end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was an extremely important period of significant political changes that eventually led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new Republic. Generally, all the political changes had an elitist character and were by no means the result of organized societal actions. This was due to a pattern of development different than Europe’s. Most of the Western European states first experienced industrialization and urbanization, and as a result of the deep socio-economic changes, a new middle-class and townspeople became the motor of political transformation. In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was still a predominantly rural society, which did not have a developed middle-class. The Sultans decided to introduce the **Tanzimat** reforms as the Ottoman Army was suffering serious defeats on the battlefield, not due to grass roots pressure from society. The Young Ottomans introduced new ideas, however, they themselves were detached from society, which was their most sig-

---


significant weakness. In other words, in the Ottoman Empire there still remained a huge gap between the center and the periphery. At the end of the nineteenth century, as a result of ‘capitalist incorporation’ and the development of cities, this started to change, as the people for the first time presented their political demands. As society was becoming more active in politics, the ruling elites had to adjust to this shift, which also included a revision in their approach towards Islam. The most significant shifts came during the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid, and later after the Young Turks gained power.

In order to throw light on the socio-economic transformation that was taking place in the Ottoman Empire, it is worth introducing the research done by Samuel P. Huntington, who in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* presents the difference between praetorian and civic societies.\(^\text{44}\) According to Huntington, the stability of a regime depends on the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization. While in civic societies, as in the case of most western European states, the increasing level of societal participation is ‘funneled’ by concomitant development of institutions, in praetorian societies, the development of institutions does not keep up with the level of participation of the society. This leads to a situation unfavorable for the development of a healthy democracy. Without proper ‘management’ of public participation there is space for corruption and populism, which actually is favorable to the emergence of extremist mass movements that guide the new democracy in antidemocratic directions.\(^\text{45}\) In other words, in participant, or civil societies, it is the institutional order that creates a link between the ruling and the ruled. In praetorian societies there is no institutionalized framework and, invoking Kornhhauser’s words: “direct relation exists between the masses and while the masses are available for mobilization by the leaders, the leaders become accessible by the masses.”\(^\text{46}\)

A similar process Huntington mentions happened in the Ottoman Empire. First of all, as a result of the *Tanzimat* reforms and the process of capitalist incorporation, the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, especially


\(\text{45}\) *Ibidem*, p. 82.

\(\text{46}\) *Ibidem*, p. 88.
those living in the newly developing cities, were mobilized by the competing elites in order to achieve political aims. In this particular case both Abdülhamid and the Young Turks, who just like the Young Ottomans were in opposition to the Sultans’ authoritarianism, found that success depended on who more effectively manipulated the masses. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Sunni Islam was an important tool in the hands of the Sultans, who by referring to Islamic principles found legitimization for their rule. However, as earlier Islam played a more ‘symbolic role’ and in practice there were no direct links between the central authorities and the representatives of the different ethnic and religious groups (perhaps with the exception of the religious leaders representing the different millets) in the times of the Young Turks and the rule of Abdülhamid the representatives of the center and those of the periphery were confronted with a new reality in which they became dependent on each other. There is no doubt that the links between the center and the periphery had to be established, however, in the case of the Ottoman Empire the change was overnight and both sides, the elites and society, were not ready for such a dramatic alteration. In this particular example, Huntington’s theory perfectly fits the Ottoman example. Due to the non-existence of an institutional structure that worked as a platform of communication between the center and the periphery, there was no chance to establish a civic society, and as most of the society was Muslim, Islam became an extremely important factor that was utilized for political means.

The first constitutional period finished quickly and was replaced by the autocratic rule of Sultan Abülhamid (1876–1908), who used the international context, more specifically the defeats suffered against Russia, to suspend the constitution and close down the new parliament. The Sultan also effectively started using Islam as a source of legitimacy in domestic and international politics. This action can be seen as a rejection of the idea of Pan Ottomanism, and an attempt at fostering unity among Muslim society and preventing the further disintegration of the state. Additionally, by centralization, the Sultan wanted to more effectively fight the Young Turkish movement that was growing in strength during the years 1902–1906, and becoming a threat to his rule. Trying to attain the support of

the masses was thus a rational action. As for international politics, Abül-
hamid rejected the policy of his predecessors and accepted a more con-
frontational attitude towards western civilization by referring the position as Caliph as a rallying force for the Muslims living outside the empire.\(^{48}\) Omar Tespinar refers to this policy as a “rational, proto-nationalistic effort to unite the peoples around imperial symbols and institutions such as the Caliphate.”\(^{49}\) In opposition to the Young Ottomans, who had an elitist approach to politics and mostly focused on the literate, upper classes, the Sultan tried to engage the masses. Abdülhamid is, therefore, the first Ot-
toman statesman who started communicating with the representatives of the periphery gathered around sheiks and dervishes.\(^{50}\)

The ‘revolution’ of 1908 by the Young Turks brought an end to the rule of the Sultans. To a large extent it was the international situation, more precisely the Balkan Wars, that brought the power to the Young Turks. The most important political platform of Young Turks was the Commitee of Union and Progress (CUP). Regarding the matter of the use of Islam, the Young Turks, just like Abdülhamid, did not underes-
timate its role as a mobilizing force. A factor that decided the populist utilization of Islam as a mobilizing force were the already-mentioned Balkan Wars, in which the Ottoman Empire lost many of its European provinces. Paradoxically, these defeats helped the CUP to centralize pow-
er, as the empire became much less polyglot, thus resolving the problem of choosing a leading political doctrine.\(^{51}\)

The Young Turks, just like the Young Ottomans, were not a Uniform group. Probably one of the most debated issues within the ranks of that group was the role of Islam in state-society relations. On one side was Ziya Gökbalp, who considered Islam to be the most important element of the new Turkish political identity. According to him, Islam was not only ‘the opiate of the masses’ that could be used for political mobilization, but social glue and a very important source of morality. What is probably more important, Gökbalp, just like Mamik Kemal, by no means saw religion as a source of backwardness.\(^{52}\) On the opposite side of the bar-

\(^{48}\) Ibidem, p. 5.
\(^{49}\) O. Tespinar, op. cit., p.18.
\(^{50}\) Ibidem, p. 18.
\(^{52}\) H. Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim…., pp. 21–22
ricade stood Abdullah Cevdet, a militant secularist, who regarded Islam as ‘problem to be solved’ if the Ottoman Empire was to catch up with Western European stares. The clash between the two mentioned ideas remains contemporary, as even now these issues are raised in the fight for power between the Islamists and secularists in Turkey. However, to that problem I will return later.

Another important outcome of the clash between the Young Turks and the Sultan was the proclamation of the second Turkish constitution. In 1908, Abdülhamid knew that the Young Turks were too strong politically, so he decided to agree to a compromise. The fruit of the compromise was the already mentioned constitution. Generally, the nature of the new document did not differ much from the previous one. While on the surface the articles referred to Islamic principles, for instance art. 11, which accepted Islam as the official religion of the empire, in reality, secularist aspects were still dominant. Art. 3 stated that the Sultanate would be given to the eldest son of the Ottoman Dynasty, and article 5 recognized the holiness in the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, which gave the Sultan virtually unlimited control over religion. However, there in the overall autocratic character of the constitution, some articles were secular and at the same time democratic in nature, which was a novelty in Ottoman tradition. An example is that according to article 3, the Sultan had to take an oath that he would conform to the constitution. Additionally, article 5 stipulated that the Council of Ministers was under the control of the Parliament. The last of the quoted articles prove that another ‘European dimension’ of secular parliamentarism was visible. Of course these were just the first steps, but without doubt the 1908 constitution did give some rights to new secular institutions and by no means increased the role of religion. Although both the Sultan and the Young Turks considered themselves as devout Muslims, they did nothing to elevate the role of Islam.

After the Young Turks took power in the state, they too made a significant contribution to the Turkish secular political system. According to Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito, the Young Turks were neither liberal nor democratic. Instead, their main characteristics were: (a) an unques-

54 Ibidem, p. 21.
tioned faith in positivism; (b) a determination to create a modern society to consolidate the power of the state; and (c) a passion for elite rule,\textsuperscript{56} which means that the group did follow a similar no less authoritarian pattern of ruling the state. Just as in the case of the Sultans, further secularization of the state was for the Young Turks one of the main goals, as it allowed the strengthening of power. The secularist reforms were conducted by the regime in the years 1908–1919, and the most important of them were, for instance, (a) the removal from the cabinet of the post of Seyhuislam, (b) the limitation of power of the religious courts, by putting them under the control of the Ministry of Justice, (c) centralization of the state by putting the medrese under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, and, last but not least, (d) the founding of the Ministry of Religious Foundations.\textsuperscript{57} All the mentioned reforms were aimed at the removal of religious influence from politics.

Concluding, while Islam remained a legitimizing factor in both cases, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and at the end of the nineteenth century, it is during the rule of the last Sultan and the Young Turks in which the leaders discovered the mobilizing factor of religion and ‘went out to the people.’ This is a very important change, as finally religion became the ‘social glue’ that could bring the center and the periphery together, and finally help foster a national identity. While following the pattern of populist Islamic politics, both Abdülhamid and the Young Turks in reality were limiting the political role of Islam by introducing more secular reforms.

Continuity or change?
The Kemalist revolution and its outcomes

Mustapha Kemal Atatürk with no doubt is one of the most successful reformers in history, who contributed greatly to the modernization of Turkey. Today, nearly a century after the implementation of Kemalist reforms, his contribution to the development of Turkey is debated. For instance, authors such as Ishan Dagi, Orhan Kemal Genkiz, and the al-


\textsuperscript{57}  O. Tespinar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.
ready mentioned Dankwart Rustow are generally becoming more critical towards the changes that took place in the beginning of the twentieth century in Turkey, in which they find the reasons of the most recent political crisis.

There is a common opinion that the Kemalist reforms were a complete break with the Ottoman past. Oliver Roy, for example, writes that Atatürk for over 15 years was devoted to the one and only task of “breaking the age-old chains of the past and bringing the inhabitants of Turkey to a more advanced level of social and intellectual culture.” From the perspective of the reformists, this sort of approach was extremely important, as in that way they detached themselves from the Ottoman past, which for over one hundred years was a period of constant failure. Establishing a new state, the Turkish Republic, on October 29, 1923, was thus a new beginning for society, and the myth of ‘breaking the chains of the past’ was a very important part of Kemalist propaganda. In this part, it will be proven that in fact the Kemalist Revolution was by no means a breaking with the past, but a continuation of the reforms that started over a century earlier.

After winning the War of Independence, Atatürk became the first president of the republic and the leader of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). The initial years of its existence were thus meaningful, called the monoparty period. Turkey from the very beginning was not a democratic regime. On the contrary, it became an authoritarian state that was effectively controlled by the ruling RPP. Atatürk himself was a member of the Young Turkish movement, and in fact he accepted a similar pattern of governing the state to his predecessors before the outbreak of the World War, which was based on elitism and radical secularism. In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished. Also, in the same year a special Law of Unification of Education was enacted that made primary (secular) education compulsory. The creation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which became responsible for religious administration, was an extremely important change. All mentioned reforms were not a novelty, even though they may seem revolutionary. In Ottoman history religious institutions were always subjected to state control. While the Sultans had the power to appoint and dismiss civil servants, including

the Seyhuislam (the highest religious official), the Young Turks also used secularization as means of control by putting religious institutions under civilian surveillance.

The Directoriat of Religious Affairs was still one of the most important instruments of control in the hands of the state, established for two purposes. Firstly, it administered over 77,000 mosques, and secondly, had control over the ‘interpretation’ of the official Sunni state Islam, which means that all imams and muftis became state employees, who were trained in special Imam Hatip schools controlled by the state.60 In the case of the control of religion, the Kemalist revolution did not introduce anything new. The Diyanet was in reality a successor of the institution of Seyhuislam. Both posts were instruments of strict control over religious activity that were directly responsible to the secular authorities. While in the first case, the Diyanet reported – and still reports – directly to the premier, the Seyhuislam was closely controlled by the Sultan. An establishment of an official Sunni branch of Islam was another similarity.

One might say, however, that the aim of the Kemalist Elite was a novelty in Turkish political system. The Kemalist regime wanted not only to reform effectively the central administrative system, but also to influence the mentality of the whole society. Many scholars refer to the Kemalist Revolution as social engineering, which had the sole purpose of creating a modern, westernized society. It is true that while the secular reforms of the Kemalist elite touched nearly every aspect of social life in Turkey, in the Ottoman Empire the influence of sharia remained in private and family life. In the new Turkish republic one of the new secular judicial forms of social control was the Swiss Civil code, which was officially accepted by the National Assembly in 1926.61 Also, proof that Atatürk wanted to take the revolution to the masses lay in the establishment of ‘Peoples’ Houses’ (Halkevleri), which, under the mantel of education centers, sports associations and clubs were in reality political indoctrination units spread all over the country and controlled by the leading RPP.62 Apart from those already mentioned, the other far reach-

62 A.Y. Dede, *Islamism, State Control over Religion and Social Identity*, Western Michigan University, Michigan, p.78.
ing reforms included: (a) the introduction of a new Latin alphabet in 1928, (b) the change of the language of the call to prayer, which was changed from Arabic to Turkish in 1932, (c) the adoption of Turkish names for cities in 1930 and 1934, (d) changing the official day of rest from Friday to Sunday (1935), and (e) the prohibition of wearing the Turban and Fez (1925). Finally, the 1928 amendment to the constitution, stating that (f) Islam was the official religion of the state, was altered in 1937, and Turkey was declared a secular state.63

No other ruling political elite went so far as the Kemalists did. Still, Atatürk was not the first who decided to interfere into the private matters of the citizens. Already in 1858 a new penal code based on the French model was introduced. Attempts to change the mentality of the people for the sole purpose of centralizing state power were meanwhile just a matter of time. The reason for which it were the Kemalists, and not the Sultans or the Young Turks, who initiated such a broad program of reform is threefold. First of all, before capitalist incorporation there was no need for such changes. As long as the local administration had control over the different Millets and the people were not engaged in politics, such incursions into private life would be pointless and even harmful, as they would most likely be met with strong opposition from the representatives of different ethnic and religious groups. Secondly, the Ottoman Empire already had an overdeveloped bureaucratic structure, and the attempt to extend it to the local level would mean further ‘inflation of the bureaucracy,’ which would be very time-consuming and expensive. And finally, as the West and Christianity remained the biggest enemy of the Ottomans, there was no point of taking any steps against Islam. The Sultans and The Young Turks, therefore, as long as they were in a state of war with different European states, decided not to take away traditions from the people, as the price they would have to pay was far too great. Still, the fact that on the outside the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state did not discourage the Sultans and the Young Turks from implementing secular reforms. Atatürk simply extended the process that was already in motion for over a century. The difference, however, was that he was one of the first to officially state that Islam was in the long run a significant obstacle to reform. Most of the representatives of the Young Turks, who were influenced by positivism, agreed that religion

63 S. Vertigans, op. cit., p. 43.
hindered development. However, they did not have the courage to openly say that to the people and treated Islam as a necessary evil.

Another question is why the Kemalist elite, and not their predecessors, decided to take the secularizing reforms to ‘another stage.’ The answer to this question is simple. The circumstances were very favorable to Atatürk and his followers. The war of independence which elevated the Kemalists to power had the most important significance. The First World War and further the occupation by the allied and Greek forces discredited both the Sultanate and the Young Turkish regime. While the Sultan was considered a collaborator and traitor in the eyes of society, the Young Turks were mostly blamed for their ill decisions during the war, especially joining the war on the side of the Central Powers. The direct presence of foreign armies triggered a never before seen nationalist feeling among the people, and Atatürk by utilized that for achieving his goals. Expelling the Greek forces from Turkey definitely enhanced his popularity. The people saw the Kemalists as liberators, and the movement achieved great popularity.

In reality, the Kemalists followed the same patterns of reform as the Sultans during the Tanzimat and the Young Turks, who knew that only secularization gave them effective instruments of control and that the functioning of religious institutions would to a lesser or larger extent be a burden for the secular establishment. The difference is that Atatürk abandoned the ‘double standard’ policy of keeping the façade of an Islamic state. Additionally, the situation after the First World War, when Turkey for the first time was not at the state of war with any other country, was the complimentary factor, encouraging the Kemalists to take the reforms to another level. The establishment of the League of Nations, the delegalization of war as a means of diplomacy by the Briand-Kellog pact, and finally the revolution in Russia, after which the biggest enemy of Turkey, the Russian Empire, ceased to exist, allowed Turkish statesmen to focus finally on inward matters instead of worrying about their borders.

With enough knowledge at hand, it has been proven that the Turkish Republic is in fact the heir to the Ottoman Empire, and the Kemalist establishment continued the secular reforms that were initiated much earlier. Another question that should be addressed is to what extent the Turkish Republic inherited the problems of the Ottoman Empire, and in what ways the secular reforms had an impact on the Turkish political system.
Without doubt the center-periphery cleavage, which still persists in Turkey, has its roots in the Ottoman past. Just as in the case of the Ottoman Empire, there is a clear division between the ruling elites and the rest of society. In the Ottoman Empire it was the Sultan and his secular bureaucracy that constructed the Sunni center, later the Young Turks became the ruling ‘enlightened elite’ after the establishment of the Republic, and then the Republican Peoples Party seized power. Even though, starting from the rule of Sultan Abdülhamid, there were attempts at integrating the periphery with the center. Both, the Young Turks and later the Kemalists, knew that enlightened or not, society was the indispensable component for maintaining political power. While the Young Turks tried to use Islam as the element that would trigger societal support, Atatürk decided to imprint a new identity in the minds of the common people, an identity that would be more ‘amendable’ than Islam. The Kemalist project and strict centralization was thus aimed at fostering a new nation. Although initially the difference between the central authorities in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic seems to be large, as the first was based on Islamic principles, and the latter on secular ones, both were in fact authoritarian and elitist. Atatürk’s reforms, just as in the case of the Sultan’s and Young Turks’ reforms, were aimed more at controlling than liberating society.

The Kemalists, however, did not manage to change the mentality of most of the common Turkish people and Islam remained an important component of the Turkish identity that represented the periphery. Although, the Turkish Republic is far less polyglot than the Ottoman Empire and ethnic Turks constitute a majority of the population, it is still an ethnically diverse country. For many of the more traditional Islamic or ethnic groups like the Kurds, the Sufi brotherhoods (tarikat-lar), the Alevi, and the Armenians, there was simply little room in the new Kemalist state.64 These ‘neglected’ groups became the subjects of Islamic mobilization and as they constituted a huge bulk of society, the new multiparty system and the introduction of a universal suffrage put them in direct conflict with the representatives of the Kemalist elite. This problem came out into the open after the first free elections in 1950, when Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party, who represented the neglected classes, gained 408 out of 487 places in parliament.65 Starting

from 1960, the center has been in constant tension with the periphery. On the one hand, the most successful parties are those who build up their support by referring to Islamic identity. The Justice Party, which is a direct successor of the Democratic Party, the Motherland Party, and finally the ruling Justice and Development Party, represent the forces of the periphery. On the other hand, the Kemalist Elites, even though smaller in numbers, have the military on their side, and the army is the guardian of the secular order, the judiciary and the state bureaucracy. The conflict between the center and the periphery is still visible in Turkish politics and the four military interventions – in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 – prove that fact.

Is this clash between the center and periphery a remnant that endured from Ottoman times, or perhaps an outcome of the reforms initiated by the Kemalists? There is no doubt that the structure of the Ottoman Empire and the relationship between the central authorities and the different ethnic and religious groups was inherited by the Turkish Republic. Still, the reforms inaugurated by Atatürk also played their part in increasing the distance between the center and the periphery. The factor that was overlooked, or rather underestimated, was Islam, which the Kemalist revolution could not eradicate from public and political life. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was mostly inspired by the teachings of the Young Turks, who, as already mentioned, did not present a uniform approach towards Islam and Ottoman society. From the two political currents represented by Ziya Gökalp, who stated that Islam was an inseparable element of Turkish mentality, and Abdullah Cevdet, who saw Islam as an obstacle to changes, the Kemalists decided to utilize the teachings of the latter, and Turkey is still paying a high price for that choice.

The outcome of the Kemalist reforms is therefore twofold. One might say that the reforms that were introduced and forced on society significantly sped up the development of Turkey, which became a close partner of the United States and Europe. One of the most important achievements of the quick process of secularization was the fact that Turkey became the only middle-eastern state to become a candidate for membership in the European Union. However, the secular reforms that tried to eliminate Islam from public and political life caused the majority of the population to see the reforms as too radical. This mostly concerned the poorer, less educated and rural representatives of the society. Yet, the bulk of society, which was more educated and mostly living in urban or
semi-urban areas, embraced Kemalism as their own. In that way, the Kemalist revolution, instead of uniting the center and periphery, enlarged the distance between those two groups.

Conclusion

Coming back to the observation of Samuel P. Huntington, who stated that Turkey is in fact a torn country, no other words could illustrate the political and international situation of that state in a more precise way. Without a doubt the two faces of Turkey are secularism and Islam, which are in constant tension and are both deeply rooted in the mentality of both the ruling elites and society. Turkish political elites have always been secular and elitist in nature. The Sultans, the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks and the Kemalist elites saw themselves as intellectually superior to society, and by all means tried to sustain their privileged position in the state. Secular law turned out to be an important instrument of political control. What is, however, worth paying attention to is the fact that with the deepening of the political crisis in the Ottoman Empire, the elites introduced further secular reforms and at the same time limited Islamic law. These actions were natural, as Islam was a political force that was extremely hard to control. Elitism, which is one of the most important obstacles in the process of democratization of Turkey, is in fact the result of a very long process of development. Most of the reforms that were introduced in both the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey were initiated by elites and not by society, which unlike European countries had no influence on politics.

Along with elitism and the development of secularism comes another problem that also hinders democratic changes, namely state-society relations and the role of Islam. Many representatives of western democratic states are afraid of the influence of political Islam in Turkey, and the Kemalist elites effectively exploited that fear for several years. The four military interventions and the banning of political parties were justified by the regime by stating that secular order was under threat. Islam was always associated with backwardness and terrorism. Here it is necessary to mention that Turkish Islam is far less extremist than Arab Islam, and that is a result of three important factors. (a) Both Kemalists and Islamists were under the influence of modern European practices,
which means that the process of westernization had a big impact on the transformation of Turkish Islam. Here, the rise of a new Islamic Anatolian business class, which in fact is pro-western, is the best evidence supporting the statement that Islam is not anti-democratic or in opposition to development.\footnote{H. Yavuz, \textit{Secularism and Muslim…}, pp. 9–16.} (b) Islam was never an anti-state tool for popular mobilization against the state. Of course, for the Kemalist establishment the very existence of Islam was a threat to the Republic and the demonization of Islam was a useful tool in sustaining political power, however, according to Brusse and Schoonenboom, even those considered to be the most extremist politicians, like Menderes or Erbakan, who were both removed from politics by the military, have always worked within the framework of a democratic, constitutional state.\footnote{W. Asbeek Brusse, I.J. Schoonenboom, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 55.} I would have some doubt about Erbakan, however in the case of Menderes this statement seems to be valid. Under his rule the Democratic Party (DP) introduced changes that on the surface may seem an attempt to ‘Islamize’ the state: for instance, the lifting of the ban on recital of the call to prayer in Arabic, or the building of 15,000 new mosques all around Turkey.\footnote{Y. Sanbay, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 128.} Still, these reforms were by no means against democratic principles, and in reality they were in line with them, as the state should protect the freedom of thought and not be anti-religious.\footnote{W. Asbeek Brusse, I.J. Schoonenboom, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 106.} The same can be said about the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002. The prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, is in fact fighting oppressive legislation, as in the case of the ban of wearing headscarves by women in public places, but this does not at the same time mean that he wants to reintroduce \textit{sharia} in the state. The AKP is thus not Islamic, as it does not seek the religious transformation of the state and society. It is a modern party that is one of the biggest supporters of European Union membership. (c) Even if there were politicians that would try and reintroduce Islamic Law in Turkey, they would not get popular support from society, as the majority of the people supports the existence of a secular state and is against the reestablishment of \textit{sharia}.\footnote{For instance, according to TESEV, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, in 2006, only 9 percent of the population supported the reestablishment of \textit{sharia}. See A. Rabasa, S. Larrabee, \textit{op. cit.}, p. xi.} Islam in Turkey is, therefore,
not an anti-democratic factor, and this standpoint is sustained by the report on Turkey prepared by Scientific Council for Government Policy. The report concluded that: “The Turkish Republic was established in 1923, and it marked the beginning of the most extreme banning of religious influence of the state (...) From the EU perspective, the issue of Islam in Turkey is not so much a problem of the influence of religion on the state as a problem of the influence of the state on religion. This is because government intervention in religion is stronger in Turkey than in EU member states even though some EU countries also recognize a state religion.”

---

**Streszczenie**

Maciej Herbut

**PRAWO, ISLAM I SEKULARYZM W IMPERIUM OSMAŃSKIM I W PIERWSZYCH LATACH ISTNIENIA REPUBLIKI TURECKIEJ**

Z uwagi na fakt, że Turcja leży na dwóch kontynentach, przez co znajduje się w obrębie wpływów europejskich i bliskowschodnich, Samuel P. Huntington nazwał to państwo rozdartym i poszukującym w dalszym ciągu swojej tożsamości. Ten dualizm można także dostrzec w sposobie funkcjonowania systemu politycznego, w którym walka o władzę toczy się między dwoma konkurującymi ze sobą ugrupowaniami politycznymi: islamiastami, na których czele stoi umiarkowana partia islamska AKP, oraz kemalistami, którzy z kolei opierają swoją siłę polityczną na armii i lojalnej biurokracji państwowej. Oficjalnie Turcja stała się państwem demokratycznym zaraz po zakończeniu drugiej wojny światowej, jednak w praktyce, nawet na początku XXI wieku trudno uznać to państwo za demokratyczne. Problemy natury systemowej, takie jak np. siła polityczna armii, kwestie dotyczące statusu ludności kurdyjskiej czy też wciąż toczący się spór o Cypr, utrudniają między innymi proces starania się tego państwa o członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że źródeł tych problemów należy szukać w przeszłości, czyli w jeszcze w czasach Imperium Osmańskiego i w okresie reform modernizacyjnych zaraz po ustanowieniu republiki w roku 1923. W dalszym ciągu jest jednak kwestią spor-

---

ną, który okres najbardziej wpłynął na kryzys polityczny, z jakim mamy obecnie do czynienia. Z jednej strony np. Rustow uważa, że Turcja wciąż ponosi konsekwencje tego, iż pierwszy reżim demokratyczny został tak naprawdę „podarunkiem od dyktatora”, jakim bez wątpienia był Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Z drugiej strony Şerif Mardin jest zdania, że to struktura imperium osmańskiego i tradycyjny konflikt „centrum–peryferie” odcisnęły swoje piętno na ówczesnym systemie politycznym tego kraju.

Głównym celem artykułu jest znalezienie odpowiedzi na pytanie, do jakiego stopnia Imperium Osmańskie można nazwać państwem islamskim. W pierwszych latach republiki, Atatürk podczas przejmowania władzy za główny swój cel obrał całkowite zerwanie z przeszłością islamską, która jego zdaniem była głównym źródłem kryzysu Imperium. Jednak po dokładniejszym zapoznaniu się ze sposobem funkcjonowania administracji osmańskiej, nie trudno dostrzec, że Islam był jedynie czynnikiem umożliwiającym sułtanom sprawowanie władzy. W rzeczywistości Imperium miało zsekularyzowany system administracyjny, w którym to sułtan sprawował niemal nieograniczoną władzę.

Następnie przedstawiony zostaje proces reform skostniałych struktur administracyjnych i prawnych Imperium Osmańskiego, wywołany wskutek integracji rynków gospodarczych z rynkami europejskimi. Reformy powszechnie znane jako Tanzimat miały na celu przede wszystkim zredukowanie dysproporcji w rozwoju technologicznym, militarnym i gospodarczym, jakie istniały między takimi państwami europejskimi, jak Niemcy, Francja czy Wielka Brytania, a Imperium Osmańskim. Co więcej, w XVIII i XIX wieku, siła Imperium powoli malała i sułtani musieli uznać wyższość Zachodu. Jednym ze sposobów wyprowadzenia państwa z kryzysu była między innymi próba stworzenia nowej osmańskiej świadomości narodowej, która miałaby zjednoczyć wszystkie ludy zamieszkujące rozległe terytoria będące pod panowaniem władz imperialnych. Istotne znaczenie dla analizy tej problematyki ma kwestia zmieniającej się relacji między islamem a administracją państwową. Jak pokazano, wraz z postępowaniem kryzysu politycznego, władze centralne dążyły do ograniczenia wpływów prawa islamskiego i zwiększenia znaczenia prawa świeckiego.

W artykule przestawiono, jak islam był wykorzystywany do celów politycznych najpierw przez sułtana Abdülhamida, a następnie przez reżim młodoturecki. Na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, wraz z postępowem procesów industrializacji i urbanizacji, a po utracie terytoriów europejskich, Imperium stało się państwem znacznie bardziej homogenicznym, w którym islam stał się religią dominującą. Władze za-

74 Ş. Mardin, Center–Periphery Relations: a Key to Turkish Politics?, Daedalous, vol. 102, nr 1, s. 169–187.
częły więc coraz częściej odwoływać się do islamu jako ideologii mobilizującej ludność. Co ciekawe, mimo zachodzących zmian, zarówno ostatni sułtan, jak i Młodzi Turcy kontynuowali proces ograniczania politycznego wpływu Islamu. W pracy sporo uwagi poświęcono reformom Atatürka, który postanowił stworzyć zupełnie nową świecką ideologię, gdzie nie było już miejsca na islam, i temu, w jaki sposób reformy te doprowadziły do ekskluzji politycznej znacznej części społeczeństwa.

Autor artykułu stawia tezę, że zarówno przeszłość Imperialna, jak i reformy kemanistów doprowadziły do kryzysu politycznego w Turcji. Po pierwsze, dysproporcje między władzami centralnymi, które reprezentował sułtan i biurokracja państwowa, a przedstawicielami różnych grup etnicznych i religijnych doprowadziły do powstania konfliktu na linii centrum–peryferie. Po drugie, reformy reżimu Atatürka, które de facto stanowiły kontynuacją reform i procesu sekularyzacji zapoczątkowanych wcześniej przez sultanów, zamiast zmniejszyć – wskutek restrykcyjnej polityki wobec islamu – zwiększyły jeszcze te dysproporcje.